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Abstract
Currently, many commercial airline aircraft cannot perform three-dimensionally guided approaches based on satellite-based 
augmentation systems. We propose a system to rebroadcast the correction and integrity data via a data link as provided by 
the ground-based augmentation system such that aircraft equipped with a GPS landing system (GLS) can use the wide-area 
corrections and perform localizer performance with vertical guidance (LPV) approaches while maintaining the same level of 
integrity. In consequence, the system loses some availability and the time to alert is slightly increased. We build a prototype 
system and present data collected for one week, confirming technical feasibility. There is a loss of 5.3 percent of availability 
during a 1-week data collection cycle in which we compared our system to standalone LPV service. We tested our prototype 
with two commercially available GLS receivers with positive results and successfully demonstrated the functionality with 
a conventional Airbus 319 equipped with a standard GLS receiver.
Keywords SBAS · Satellite · Navigation · Augmentation · Aviation · GPS · GNSS
Introduction
Within the last two decades, aviation navigation has been 
slowly transitioning from a ground-based infrastructure 
to rely increasingly on global navigation satellite systems 
(GNSSs). This has led the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) to standardize a navigation perfor-
mance concept called performance-based navigation (PBN) 
(ICAO 2012). Within PBN, the system performance require-
ments for navigation equipment are specified as required 
navigation performance (RNP) for onboard navigation capa-
bility with a high level of accuracy and integrity. For preci-
sion instrument approaches that utilize three-dimensional 
angular guidance to a dedicated runway, two possibilities 
exist to improve the lateral and especially the vertical navi-
gation integrity, accuracy, continuity and availability. On 
the one hand, GNSS reference stations are distributed over 
a wide area at precisely known locations. They measure the 
GNSS signals and send the data to a master control station. 
The master control station computes correction and integrity 
information, which is broadcast to the user via a geostation-
ary satellite. This is called the satellite-based augmentation 
system (SBAS). On the other hand, to achieve GNSS aug-
mentation at an airport only, it is sufficient to place two to 
four reference stations at the airport and have a local pro-
cessing facility. The correction and integrity information are 
passed on to the user via a very-high-frequency (VHF) radio 
data link. This is called the ground-based augmentation sys-
tem (GBAS). In both cases, the user applies the corrections 
to its GNSS measurements and computes a highly accurate 
position.
Using a final approach segment (FAS) data block, the 
aircraft’s computer can then calculate angular deviations 
to a reference trajectory (Dautermann 2014), which result 
in a guidance signal approximating the classic instrument 
landing system (ILS) (Forssell 2008). For SBAS, the FAS 
data block is stored in the aircraft’s navigation database, 
while for GBAS the FAS data block is broadcast as a VHF 
data message. In both systems, instant integrity informa-
tion is provided by estimating protection levels, which is 
a high-probability bound for the computed position. This 
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is then compared to the alarm limit of the respective sys-
tem. Implementation standards for airborne receivers using 
SBAS are governed by the relevant documents of the Euro-
pean Commission for Civil Aviation Equipment (ED75D 
2000) and the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronaut-
ics (RTCA 2016) as well as acceptable means of compli-
ance (AMC) published European Aviation Safety Agency 
(AMC2028 2012) and (AMC2027 2009). The standards for 
GBAS ground stations, VHF data broadcast and airborne 
user receivers are laid out by ED114B (2019) and RTCA 
(2004) as well as RTCA (2017a, b). Instrument approaches 
using either SBAS or GBAS are currently approved to be 
flown down to a decision height of 200ft and a runway visual 
range of 550 meters (ESSP 2016).
It is important to note that SBAS does currently not 
support automatic landings. Dautermann et  al. (2012) 
describe GBAS research and development that will enable 
low-visibility operations in the near future, supported by 
multiple satellite navigation system constellations (Felux 
et al. 2017). Interestingly, the core principle of SBAS and 
GBAS is identical: Pseudorange corrections are provided 
to the user, who, in turn, applies respective corrections to 
improve position accuracy and integrity. In addition to those 
corrections, each system makes available real-time informa-
tion about the quality of the GNSS signal in the form of 
a Gaussian variance for each pseudorange. With very few 
exceptions, SBAS is not available in Part 25 (EASA 2018) 
aircraft used for commercial air transport and GBAS is not 
installed in small business and general aviation airplanes. 
A notable exception is the satellite landing system (SLS), 
available as an option on the new Airbus A350 and soon to 
be available on new A320s. Boeing does currently not offer 
SBAS on its production airplanes, but GBAS has been a 
standard option on all 737 aircraft since the −800 model as 
well as on the 747-8 and 787. Since both systems are quite 
similar and the SBAS signal can nowadays be decoded by 
even low-cost receivers, one could receive the augmentation 
data from the SBAS, slightly modify it to fit into the GBAS 
data structure and broadcast these data to a GBAS-equipped 
aircraft. Said aircraft could execute an RNP approach with 
the localizer performance and vertical (LPV) guidance final 
approach segment, which would otherwise not be available. 
This may be especially handy in places where no non-pre-
cision minima are published, such as the RNP-E approach 
into Innsbruck.
Time to alert would be slightly increased by the ground 
reception, processing and rebroadcasting process. A similar 
concept was proposed for the local airport monitor concept 
for GBAS by Shively et al. (2006), Shively (2006) and Rife 
et al. (2005, 2006), but from the point of view of a position 
domain monitoring facilitator. Here, we focus on really mak-
ing the SBAS signal usable for GBAS-equipped aircraft, 
a concept which was called “bent pipe” in Shively et al. 
(2006) and never fully explored. The ground-based regional 
augmentation system (GRAS) was a system planned for 
Australia as a regional augmentation system (Crosby et al. 
2000). In lieu of broadcasting regional corrections via a sat-
ellite downlink, they were intended to be transmitted via a 
VHF data link. Here, we want to assemble SBAS corrections 
at a local facility to mimic GBAS correction and “trick” 
a GBAS receiver into outputting an SBAS position with 
the associated SBAS integrity. We call the system GLASS 
(GLS approaches using SBAS) and it is simply a converter 
which provides SBAS data and integrity information using 
a GBAS channel. Unlike Shively et al. (2006) and the asso-
ciated references, we do not attempt to increase integrity, 
nor do we attempt to broadcast GRAS-like regional cor-
rections as described in Crosby et al. (2000). We perform 
a first assessment of integrity transfer between SBAS and 
GBAS and show the technical feasibility of using GLASS in 
GBAS-equipped aircraft. Since there are slight differences 
between the two systems, we need to make sure that integrity 
for the safety-of-life approach service is ensured.
Algorithm and integrity considerations
One of the core integrity functionalities of any airborne 
GNSS receiver, augmented or not, is the computation of the 
position uncertainty at the allocated integrity risk. This is 
referred to as a protection level, which is then compared to 
a maximum allowable value, the alert limit. If the protection 
level exceeds the alert limit, the system cannot maintain the 
required integrity and flags itself as unavailable. In order 
to ensure full compliance with ICAO standards, the GBAS 
receiver onboard the aircraft should output protection lev-
els identically to the ones computed by a pure SBAS-based 
receiver. If this cannot be achieved, the protection level must 
be larger than the one of the pure SBAS receivers, but in 
turn, this may lead to a degraded availability.
At each epoch, an airborne user receiver utilizing SBAS 
and certified according to DO229E (RTCA 2016) computes 
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applications with vertical guidance and represent an integ-
rity error bound at the probabilities pvertical = 0.98 × 10−7 
and phorizontal = 2 × 10−9 at any moment. This stems from the 
integrity risk allocation that “the probability that horizontal 
cross-track error or vertical error or both exceed their respec-
tive protection levels must not exceed 2 × 10−7 per approach” 
(RTCA 2016).
The i are the post-correction range uncertainties and 
are composed of the individual errors whose distributions 
are overbound by zero-mean Gaussians. They consist of
where i,UIRE is the value extracted from the ionosphere grid 
data by interpolating the transmitted grid uncertainties GIVE 
and mapping them to the satellite elevation angle. i,flt is the 
residual user differential range error relating to the orbit and 
clock (RTCA 2016) and is computed by the ground segment 
and transmitted as part of the fast correction message. It 
describes the residual error that remains after the application 
of the fast corrections. The airborne receiver noise and mul-
tipath are characterized by i,air which varies with airborne 
equipment quality. i,tropo is derived from a constant mod-
eling uncertainty of 12 cm for the troposphere vertical error 
and converted to a slant value using an elevation mapping 
function. The square root term in the equation above is the 
standard deviation of the positioning error in the direction 
of the largest horizontal eigenvector of the position domain 
variance–covariance matrix. On the other hand, the GBAS 
approach service type C protection levels are calculated as 
the maximum over a set of individual protections levels 
assuming normal operation ( H0 ) and ground station refer-
ence receiver fault ( H1 ). In GBAS, the reference receiver 
performance is characterized by B(ias) values (RTCA 2004), 
which are constantly computed by the ground subsystem and 
transmitted via VHF radio. There is one B value per satel-
lite i in view of receiver j . Details of the GBAS protection 
level calculation are stated in DO253d (RTCA 2017b) or 
ED114B (2019). The VHF data broadcast content and mes-
sage structure are described in DO245A (RTCA 2004), for 
example, and are summarized here. For approach services, 
we have as the expression for the lateral and vertical protec-
tion levels ( X ∈ {L,V}):
where X is lateral or vertical. The protection levels in case 























where Kffmd is the fault-free missed detection multiplier. 
In the case of GBAS, 2
i
 is again the post-correction range 
model error variance, but different from the ones used in 
SBAS aided positioning. In GBAS,
where pr_gnd,i characterizes the post-smoothing pseudorange 
error, tropo,i describes the remaining troposphere error after 
applying the GBAS troposphere model, 2
pr_air,i
 is a model for 
airborne pseudorange noise and multipath and iono,i models 
the remaining ionospheric error after the application of the 
correction terms. The protection levels of in the reference 
receiver fault case are
and the difference between i,H1 and i is a pr_gnd,i inflated 
by the number of reference receivers divided by the number 
of reference receivers minus one.
In order to use SBAS via a GBAS receiver and ensure 
integrity, we must inflate the standard deviations of the 
GBAS data broadcast such that the lateral protection level 
computed by the GBAS receiver is equal to or larger than 
the horizontal protection level of an SBAS receiver. The 
same is true for the vertical protection level. However, 
unlike the difference between vertical and lateral, here 
we need not be concerned as much about the difference in 
the direction of the largest error. Moreover, we must com-
pute the pseudorange corrections (PRCs) and range rate 
corrections (RRCs) for each satellite from the individual 
components of the SBAS broadcast. Since SBAS does not 
have local ground reference stations, it consequently does 
not have an equivalent to the B values of GBAS. Like in 
Shivelyet al. (2006), we set all B values to zero such that 
the H1 protection level is never used.
Figure 1 shows a schematic of our data processing. In 
the following, we will describe each block of the figure to 
create a GBAS data broadcast that allows a GLS airborne 
receiver to use LPV service using SBAS-corrected GNSS 
data. We compare the individual variance contributions 
and multiplier to ensure that the protection levels com-
puted in the GBAS receiver using SBAS data are at least 
the SBAS protection levels or larger. For each contribu-
tion, we also analyze the PRC component
Normal signal variance and non‑atmospheric errors
SBAS broadcast is used to assemble a user differential range 
error (UDRE), and a corresponding indicator (UDREI) per 
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characterize the short-term orbit and clock variations. This 
index is used in a lookup table to obtain the residual range 
uncertainties UDRE . The UDRE is used in computing flt , 





The non-atmospheric, non-orbit error contribution 
is called PRCFC . These were originally intended to cap-
ture the artificial clock degradation of selected avail-
ability. Long-term corrections to satellite orbit and clock 










 and clock correction polynomial 
coefficients ( af0, af1 ) and are called long-term correc-
tions (LTC). Using the receiver-satellite line of sight, we 
compute the orbit coordinate offset component along the 
line of sight and add this to the UDRE and clock correc-
tion to obtain a basic PRC for each satellite i,
where t0 is the time of applicability of the SBAS fast correc-
tion. The term r̂i ⋅
(


































































Fig. 1  Block diagram of the GLASS algorithms. From the SBAS 
messages and the GPS ephemeris, the pseudorange corrections and 
a measurement variance are calculated. The variance is inflated and 
used as pr_gnd . Together with predetermined, fixed parameters and 
a FAS data block, the GBAS VHF data broadcast is assembled and 
transmitted
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user-satellite line of sight vector and orbit correction param-
eters obtained from the long-term correction message.
Troposphere
The tropospheric correction used by SBAS is a multi-equa-
tion model based on wet and dry delay decomposition:
where dhyd and dwet are the estimated range delays for a sat-
ellite at 90° elevation angle caused by the atmosphere in 
hydrostatic equilibrium and by the atmosphere’s water con-
tents. m() is the elevation mapping function from zenith to 
the current satellite elevation angle. h is the altitude of the 
aircraft above the WGS84 ellipsoid, easily transferable to 
geoid height using an undulation model such as EGM2008 
(Pavlis et al. 2008). Both the hydrostatic and the wet delay 
terms contain a dependency on the height of the receiver 
above mean sea level (RTCA 2016, Appendix A-9) as well 
as tabulated values of pressure, temperature, temperature 
lapse rate, water vapor pressure and water vapor lapse rate. 
For a given installation at fixed latitude, all values but the 
user height can be interpolated rapidly. The residual uncer-
tainty is taken as
In GBAS, the tropospheric correction is computed 
according to the RTCA DO253D (RTCA 2017b) as
with Δh being the height difference between the GBAS refer-
ence point and the aircraft and  the elevation angle of the 
satellite. This tropospheric correction subtracts the part of 
the tropospheric delay between GBAS ground station and 
aircraft, assuming that the delays are spatially correlated 
with the horizontal distance between the two. NR and h0 are 
the refractivity index and tropospheric scale height from the 
type two GBAS message, respectively. The residual tropo-
sphere uncertainty tropo after applying this correction is 
dependent on the refractivity uncertainty N , which is also 
































In order to correctly achieve the SBAS tropospheric cor-
rection at the aircraft, we need to set parameters N and h0 
such that the difference between the SBAS correction and 




TCSBAS(h) − TCSBAS(h = 0) + TCGBAS(h)
]
. Due to the 
different models used in the two systems, it is not possible 
to obtain an optimal solution that minimized this difference 
for all elevation angles and all aircraft altitudes. The higher 
the difference, the higher the altitude difference between the 
ground station and the aircraft. The ICAO document for pro-
cedure design (ICAO, 2014) states that “the FAP should not 
normally be located more than 18.5 km (10.0 NM) before 
the threshold, unless adequate glide path guidance beyond 
the minimum specified in Annex 10 is provided.” Ten nauti-
cal miles and a three-degree glide path angle translate to an 
intercept altitude of about 3120ft above ground level. Thus, 
for our search of the optimal N and h0 , we place the aircraft 
at an altitude of 4000 ft above the ground station, much 
higher than an instrument approach would usually start. We 
performed a grid search over all possible values of N , rang-
ing from 16 to 781 and h0 ranging from 0 to 25,500 m as 
limited by the VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) message struc-
ture (RTCA 2017a). The elevation angle was varied from 5° 
to 90°. An extract from this search is shown in Fig. 2.
In general, Fig. 2 shows a similar pattern in error behavior 
for each elevation angle as well as an anti-proportionality of 
the error with respect to the elevation angle. Since in the 
position solution SBAS satellites with higher elevation 
angles are equipped with a higher weight and hence contrib-
ute most to the position accuracy, we chose the pair of N and 
h0 which minimizes the error between TCSBAS and TCGBAS 
for a satellite at zenith. Figure  3 shows that this pair 
(N = 316, h0 = 8500), when used for other elevation angles 
and other aircraft height, only results in a maximum range 
error of 3 mm, which is acceptable and below the pseudor-
ange noise threshold. We choose to set N = 0 in the ground 







 . Thus, the tropospheric variance 
is contained in the transmitted variance pr,gnd and will be 
used by the onboard GBAS receiver.
Ionosphere
In SBAS, the ionospheric corrections and error characteriza-
tions are computed using a broadcast grid with associated 
grid ionosphere vertical error indices (GIVEI) and a delay 
value for L1. The user then interpolates the ionospheric 
grid at locations where its receiver-satellite line of sight 
penetrates the ionosphere at an assumed altitude of 350 km 
above the ground. At the interpolation point, the SBAS user 
obtains an ionospheric variance i,UIRE and an ionospheric 
correction term ICi which is mapped along the line of sight 
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to the satellite using Fpp() , a vertical to slant mapping func-
tion. When using GBAS, the ionospheric correction is part 
of the measured pseudorange correction, and the ionospheric 
post-correction variance is based on the standard deviation 
of the ionospheric gradient iono,verticalgradient between user 
and ground station:
where dair is the distance between GBAS ground station and 
user and vair the velocity of the user. Since this term depends 
on distance, while the ionospheric residual error of SBAS 
does not, we chose to set iono,verticalgradient = 0 in the GBAS 
station and add the residual ionospheric error variance 
2
i,UIRE
 to the broadcast 2
pr,gnd






Since ICAO PANS-OPS (ICAO 2014) generally decrees 
a final approach segment of 10 nautical miles or less, we 
assume this as the maximum distance the GLASS system 
can be used and compute the largest 2
i,UIRE
 along the trajec-
tory and use it in our system.
As the SBAS Ionospheric Grid is coarsely spaced at 
5° latitude and longitude, we compute the SBAS iono-





the transmitted PRC. In doing so, we introduce a small 
error in the pseudorange correction, i.e., the difference 
between the ionospheric correction at the ground station 
and the ionospheric correction that an SBAS user would 
compute at his location at a maximum distance of 10 NM. 
If we assume a maximum distance of 10 NM between user 
and GLASS station and the maximum possible difference 
between adjacent vertical delays at grid points of 63.75 m 
and a minimum elevation angle, the maximum value of 
this error will be 1.33 m. This error diminishes as the 
aircraft approaches the GLASS ground station or a refer-
ence point at which the SBAS differential corrections are 
constructed. This is below the maximum undetected error 
of 1.5 m, a requirement for GBAS approach service type 
D for low-visibility operations. This error can be covered 
by sigma inflation as described by van Graas et al. (2004) 
and Walter et al. (2004).
Fig. 2  Searching over refractive index N and scale height h0 to find 
the pair to give the smallest error
Fig. 3  Using the value which minimizes the error at high elevation 
angles for all aircraft height and GPS satellite elevation angles. The 
largest error is 1.3 mm for the values of N = 316 and h0 = 8500 m
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Lateral to horizontal protection level inflation
When computing protection levels, there are subtle differ-
ences between SBAS and GBAS: The GBAS calculates the 
lateral protection level in the cross-track direction to the final 
approach path, while SBAS calculates horizontal protection 
levels into the direction of the largest horizontal error. Sec-
ond, GBAS adds the projection of the along-track error com-
ponent onto the vertical protection level, while SBAS uses 
the pure vertical error. Due to these differences, we need to 
inflate the final pr,gnd value before inserting it into the GBAS 
message in order to compute lateral protection levels in the 
airborne GBAS receiver that are equal to or larger than the 
horizontal one for SBAS. Due to the added along-track com-
ponent, the VPLGBAS is already larger than the VPLSBAS and 
no inflating action is required. However, the lateral error 
component will always be less or equal to the semimajor axis 
component, and therefore, pr,gnd needs to be increased. The 
inflation affects all protection level dimensions, and with the 
vertical dilution of precision normally being larger than the 
horizontal, this will lead to a large increase in VPL. In order 
to derive the direction of the semimajor axis of the error 
ellipse, we find the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the hori-
zontal variance–covariance matrix. The eigenvector corre-
sponding to the largest eigenvalue is the semimajor axis and 
the largest eigenvalue is the variance in this direction (Soren-
son 1980). The inflation factor becomes thus Γ = semimajor
lateral
 . 
The broadcast pr,gnd,i,brdcast is then
The airborne receiver is not obliged to use all the satel-
lites for which it receives correction data. In such a case, the 
needed inflation factor may increase or decrease depending 
on the broadcast range variance when looking at the vari-
ous subsets. The need for an increasing inflation factor is 
captured by the ground processor prior to broadcasting cor-
rection data by searching over all usable subsets of satellites 
and using the maximum Γ.
K multipliers
During the certification of both GBAS and SBAS for 
approach services, integrity risk is allocated to the horizon-
tal and vertical protection bounds, the protection levels. This 
is achieved by setting the K multipliers in (1), (2) and (4) to 
the value corresponding to that risk. In SBAS approach 
applications KV = 5.33 , KH = 6 and in GBAS approach appli-
cations Kffmd = 5.84 if M = 4 ground receivers are used. 
Since in GBAS the K is dependent on the number of ground 
receivers used, and in SBAS it is not, we chose M = 4 in 
order to keep the inflation factor at its minimum, keeping in 
(14)pr,gnd,i,brdcast = Γpr,gnd,i.
mind that we only want to make SBAS usable in a GBAS 
receiver. In order to guarantee that our protection levels are 
equal to or larger than standalone SBAS, we need to inflate 
our broadcast sigma further by at least KH
Kffmd
= 1.028 rounded 
up to the larger third decimal place such that 
pr,gnd,i,brdcast = 1.028Γpr,gnd,i.
Sigma air
For the same airborne accuracy designator, the pr_air,i of 
GBAS and air,i of SBAS are identical. So far, we have modi-
fied pr,gnd,i,brdcast to include SBAS ionospheric and tropo-
spheric contributions. The corresponding GBAS equivalents 
were set to zero by adjusting GBAS message type 4. When 
comparing (2) with (5), it becomes apparent that pr_air,i and 
air,i are not accounted for in the geometric inflation. There-
fore, we need to increase pr,gnd,i,brdcast more to account for 
the geometric difference in error propagation. air,i and pr,air,i 
are identically calculated for both systems and reach their 
maximum value of 0.57 m for a satellite elevation angle 
of 5° and airborne accuracy designator A. We increase the 
broadcast pr,gnd,i,brdcast factor to account for this worst-case 
assumption:
This solution is overly conservative and assumes a worst-
case satellite elevation angle. We can assume that the dif-
ference in satellite elevation between an airborne user at a 
maximum altitude of 10,000 ft MSL and the system located 
on the ground is negligible as the GPS satellite altitude is 
roughly 22,000 km. To be conservative, we can subtract 1° 
of elevation and calculate pr_air,i using this value. Then,
is the final expression for the inflated value of pr,gnd,i,brdcast 
used in the GLASS. We deliberately chose to scale the stand-
ard deviation and not the variance, since it is  that is used 
in the VDB broadcast according to RTCA (2016). Note that 
the above calculation can easily be transferred to variances 
by mathematical equivalence transformation.
Alert limit scaling
The standards for data transmission in a GBAS (RTCA 
2004) only allow a maximum value of 25.4 m to be entered 
as a final approach segment vertical alert limit (FAS-
VAL) as opposed to the SBAS LPV approach service 
FASVAL of 50  m. The GBAS final approach segment 
alert limits are scaled with distance from the glide path 
intercept point (GPIP), which is typically about 1000 ft 
upwind of the landing threshold. The scaling equation is 
(15)pr,gnd,i,brdcast = 1.028Γpr,gnd,i + 0.57(Γ − 1).
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0.095965Hp + FASVAL − 5.85 , where Hp is the height of 
the aircraft above the GPIP location. This equation is valid 
up to 1340ft above the GPIP after which the VAL remains 
at FASVAL + 33.35 m. At the same time, the lateral alert 
limit (LAL) is scaled 0.0044D + FASLAL − 3.85, where D 
is the horizontal distance to the landing threshold point. This 
equation is valid up to a distance of 7500 m, after which 
the LAL stays at FASLAL + 29.15m . Using a FASVAL 
of 25.4 m and the GBAS scaling, the vertical alert limit 
value of 50 m is reached at an altitude of 317.30 m. If we 
want the LAL to reach its value of 40 m at the same time, 
the FASLAL must be set to 17.21 m. Using a standard 3° 
glide path angle, we calculated the obstacle assessment sur-
faces according to ICAO PANS-OPS (ICAO 2014) using 
the ICAO provided software (https ://www.icao.int/safet y/
airna vigat ion/ops/pages /pans-ops-oas-softw are.aspx). At 
the above-mentioned point at a distance of 5741 m from the 
threshold, the procedure designer uses an APV-1 obstacle 
assessment surface height of 157.47 m above the LTP with 
a width of plus–minus 320 m. No obstacle may penetrate 
this surface without an increase in visibility and/or decision 
altitude such that the obstacle does not pose a risk to the 
flight. Thus, the aircraft at an altitude of 317.3 m on the glide 
path is 159.83 m above the obstacle surface, more than three 
times the alert limit. This separation increases as altitude 
increases. From the identified point down to decision alti-
tude, the alert limits are more conservative than required for 
LPV. Above the point, they are larger, but due to the obstacle 
assessment performed by the procedure designer, the colli-
sion risk is not increased, and the operation does not become 
unsafe. If the FASVAL were reduced to 16.65 m in order 
to reach a maximum of 50 m at 1340 ft above the runway, 
availability might become severely downgraded.
Time to alert
Generally speaking, ED114B (2019) describes the time to 
alert as “The time to alert is defined as the time between 
the onset of the condition where the relative position error 
exceeds the alert limit and the transmission of the last bit of 
the message that contains the integrity data that reflects the 
condition.”
The European Aviation Safety agency certified EGNOS 
for precision approach service, and hence, it must fulfill the 
ICAO (2018) requirement of 5.2 s (Annex 10, Appendix B, 
Sect. 3.5.7.5.1). The proof remains an unpublished docu-
ment titled “EGNOS Signal-in-Space System Safety Case 
Part A (Design, Development and Deployment) Issue 3 from 
21 February 2008.”
We receive the SBAS data at user receiver level before 
computing the augmented position. The additional process-
ing as described previously and as shown in Fig. 1 does 
certainly introduce a small delay and increases time to alert. 
From experience, a process involving inversion of positive 
definite matrix with sizes less than 50 by 50 elements on 
modern personal computers takes around 10 ms or less. 
When using the algorithm described above, we can con-
sider this processing time almost negligible. However, a 
qualitative assessment of the additional time in the conver-
sion process should be performed once the algorithms are 
programmed in certifiable code, which is out of the scope 
of this publication. The VHF broadcast message for GLS 
is updated every 0.5 s and the GBAS signal in space time 
to alert is requirement of 3 s (see ICAO (2018), Attach-
ment D, Table D5-C, first row). This yields a total time to 
alert of 8.7 s, which is sufficient for an instrument approach 
procedure designed according to criteria for APproach with 
Vertical guidance type 1 (APV-1). An APV-1 requires a time 
to alert of 10 s, while a precision approach requires 10 s 
according to ICAO (2018), Table 3.7.3.4-1. Unlike a pre-
cision approach, an APV-1 has a lowest possible decision 
height of 250 ft above ground level compared to 200 ft for 
a precision approach.
Implementation and bench test
After implementing the necessary algorithms in C++, we 
connected a 64-bit Linux PC running SUSE Linux to an 
SBAS-enabled Septentrio AsteRx3 receiver via TCP/IP. 
The GNSS receiver was connected to a Leica AR20 choke 
Ring Antenna located on the roof of the DLR Institute of 
Flight Guidance in Braunschweig. Our software also cal-
culates at the same time SBAS and GBAS protection levels 
as well as the positions of the connected antenna. We col-
lected Navstar GPS data at the DLR Institute of Flight Guid-
ance (52.3148848778 N, 10.5634639104 E, 143.364 m in 
WGS84) over the course of 1 week from July 15–21, 2018, 
at 2 Hz and used the final approach segment data block from 
runway 26 of Braunschweig–Wolfsburg airport.
Figures 4 and 5 show example protection levels of 24 h 
and histograms using the full one-week data set of the ratios 
of GLASS LPL to SBAS HPL and GLASS VPL to SBAS 
VPL, respectively. We can see from only having ratio values 
above one that our inflation factor effectively maps the error 
location of the semimajor axis of the current satellite geom-
etry into the lateral component of the approach coordinate 
system used in GBAS. In consequence of the vertical, where 
inflation is not needed and we also have a higher K multiplier 
for SBAS protection levels, we see a larger increase in the 
ratios between GBAS VPL and SBAS VPL with a minimum 
above 1.4.
We then plotted the data into a Stanford integrity dia-
gram created by Walter et al. (1999) using the maximum 
possible GBAS alert limit of 25.4 m. Figure 6 shows that 
the system caused 5.44% unavailability due to the inflation 
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of the vertical protection level, which is 5.3% more unavail-
ability compared to the uninflated case. When comparing 
the pure SBAS integrity plot with the GBAS one, we can 
easily see the “stretching” of the data in the direction of the 
abscissa. If the FASVAL for the data was reduced to 16.65 m 
as mentioned in the previous section, the availability would 
drop from 94.56 to 43.39%, which surely is not acceptable 
to any user. Note that the FASVAL is applied here to a static 
measurement. As mentioned, the GBAS alert limit scales 
with distance from the airport. In order to have any desired 
availability, a potential user must evaluate the availability 
at the limit of the operational use of the GLASS, i.e., at the 
decision height.
Next, we performed a system verification using our test 
van, a Mercedes transporter, equipped with real avionics 
hardware. In the vehicle, we installed a red-labeled (non-
qualified avionics, used for testing) Rockwell–Collins GLU-
925 multi-mode receiver (MMR) from an Airbus A320 
and a Honeywell integrated navigation radio (INR) from 
the Boeing 787 connected to a Novatel Pinwheel antenna. 
Data were collected from both receivers via the ARINC429 
bus with a Condor CEI-530ci PCI interface card. For the 
transmit function, we connected a Telerad EM9009 GBAS 
VHF transmitter to the previously mentioned Linux PC. The 
PC and Telerad were synchronized using a one-pulse-per-
second output signal from the Septentrio receiver. The soft-
ware was configured to broadcast GBAS message types 1, 
2 and 4 as specified for the GAST-C service. Using the test 
vehicle, we tuned the FAS data block of runway 26 at Braun-
schweig–Wolfsburg airport and drove onto the runway for 
localizer deviation tests. The GNSS antenna was mounted on 
the left side of the vehicle slightly behind the driver’s head. 
The driver then tried to keep the left wheels of the van on 
the runway centerline. The runway centerline is 90 cm wide. 
At 3420 s, the driver tried to correct the vans position such 
that the deviation would be zero meters. This attempt was 
unsuccessful; the van and driver combination did not have 
the capability to steer in the sub-decimeter range. Figure 7 
shows the result of both navigation receivers. The top panel 
shows the rectilinear horizontal deviations in meters from 
ARINC429 label 116 (ARINC429-20 2001). The bottom 
panel shows the lateral protection level from label 156 as 
well as protection levels computed at the GLASS installation 
site. In the top panel, we can see that the rectilinear localizer 
deviation of both receivers agrees within a few decimeters, 
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Fig. 4  Comparison of the vertical protection levels during 24 h. (Top) 
temporal evolution of the vertical protection levels. (Bottom) Ratio of 
the vertical protection levels for data collected for 1 week. The small-
est value is 1.2
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Fig. 5  Comparison of the lateral and horizontal protection levels dur-
ing 24 h. (Top) temporal evolution of the lateral and horizontal pro-
tection level. (Bottom) Ratio of the lateral to horizontal protection 
levels for data collected for 1 week. The smallest value is 1.025
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Fig. 6  Integrity analysis of the 
GLASS. (Left) Integrity plot of 
the GLASS navigation solution 
vertical component. (Right) 
Integrity plot of the standard 
SBAS position solution vertical 
component. The inflation can 
be recognized by the elongation 
along the abscissa












































0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5
log(#samples) of total 1207045 samples
Fig. 7  Dynamic test performed 
on Braunschweig’s runway 
26 using a Rockwell Collins 
GLU925 and a Honeywell 
INR. The top panel shows the 
horizontal deviation output 
from both receivers. At 3420 s, 
the van driver tried to correct 
the deviation to zero, but it 
was unsuccessful. The drive 
technical error was too large to 
achieve absolute zero. The bot-
tom panel indicates the lateral 
protection level as computed by 
the two multi-mode receivers 
(red and blue), the SBAS hori-
zontal protection level (purple) 
and the lateral protection level 
computed by the GLASS soft-
ware (green) at the location of 
the SBAS receiver. Even though 
it was fed by the same VDB and 
GPS antennas and both receiv-
ers tracked all GPS satellites 
in view, the LPL output by the 
INR is three meters larger than 
the one output by the GLU925
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with the INR data always being offset to the North (since the 
runway is more or less in east–west direction). The differ-
ence is below the GBAS required accuracy of 16 m and as 
such within specification. In the bottom panel, we show the 
lateral protection level for the FAS data block of runway 26 
from both receivers as well as the GLASS lateral protection 
level and the SBAS horizontal protection level computed 
at the GLASS installation. We see that inflation increases 
all LPLs above the SBAS HPL. All protection levels follow 
the sawtooth pattern that is characteristic of SBAS protec-
tion levels due to the degradation of the corrections. The 
same 12 GPS satellites above the mask angle were tracked 
by all receivers. Interestingly, the Honeywell INR LPL is 
about three meters larger than the Collins GLU925 LPL. 
The Collins GLU925 LPL is again roughly one meter larger 
than the theoretical GLASS LPL computed by the GLASS 
software. This difference may be due to the models of pr,air 
implemented in both receivers. The large difference between 
the two aviation receivers could possibly be explained by 
Honeywell using a very conservative, overbounding, non-
standard model for pr,air.
Flight demonstration and automatic landing
In order to demonstrate the full functionality of the GLASS, 
we chartered an Airbus A319, registration D-AIBI, operated 
by Lufthansa. This Airbus is one of five within the Luf-
thansa fleet that have the GLS option enabled and was used 
in the Single European Sky Air traffic management Research 
(SESAR) large-scale demonstration projects Automated 
Approaches to Land AAL (Land 2016). In addition, they 
are currently also used for GLS automatic land trials in the 
SESAR very-large-scale demonstration project AAL 2. The 
D-AIBI has two Collins GLU-925 installed, the same type of 
receiver that was also used for ground bench testing. Due to 
the encapsulated nature, only a certain subset of ARINC429 
data (ARINC429-20 2001) is available via the electronic 
flight bag connection (Abdelmoula and Scholz 2018). On 
May 6, 2019, we performed multiple GLASS approaches 
to runway 26 of Braunschweig–Wolfsburg airport. Fig-
ure 8 shows the data recorded during the last approach that 
was concluded with an automatic landing. The autopilot 
remained engaged from localizer capture until the end of the 
rollout phase. The approaches were flown using the stand-
ard RNP approach profile and final approach segment data 
blocks as published in the German Aeronautical Information 
Publication (http://www.dfs-ais.de/). The top panel of the 
figure shows the localizer and glideslope deviations, and the 
bottom panel shows the sequence of the flight management 
computer’s guidance modes with respect to the along-track 
distance from the glide path intercept point with the run-
way. From 4 km out until touch down, we can distinguish a 
small oscillation of about 0.01° in amplitude and about 1 km 
in periodicity. When crossing the threshold, the localizer 
deviation also starts drifting toward a bias of −0.03° in the 
rollout phase. Of course, since any aircraft during the rollout 
phase closes in on the localizer azimuth reference point, the 
angular sensitivity increases, while the inertia of the aircraft, 
coupled with wheel friction, acts as a low-pass filter on the 
deviation indication. Moreover, the variation in localizer is 
indeed very small and barely distinguishable by the pilot 
on the primary flight display. The aircraft also follows the 
desired glide path slightly lower than intended beginning 
2 km from touchdown. When closing in on the threshold, 
the radar altimeter is usually fed into the autopilot in order 
to guide the aircraft during an automatic flare. Flare, also 
sometimes called the round-out, is the final aircraft maneu-
ver during the landing phase. Again, the deviation from the 
glide path is very small and almost not identifiable on the 
pilots’ displays. The cockpit video of this approach can be 
found as supplemental material to this manuscript.
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Fig. 8  Localizer performance and vertical guidance during the 
approach and automatic landing. The top panel shows the localizer 
and glideslope deviations, and the bottom panel shows the sequence 
of the flight management computer’s guidance modes as a function of 
distance from the touchdown point. The vertical black line indicates 
the threshold crossing point
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Conclusions
The system works as intended with some restrictions in 
availability due to the protection level inflation and pro-
vides SBAS APV-1 capability to GLS-equipped users. It 
maintains the SBAS integrity and time to alert is a com-
bination of the allotments for SBAS and GBAS. Since the 
SBAS signal is provided free of charge by most authorities 
and can be obtained with low-cost receivers, the system 
provides a cost-effective way to provide GLS approaches 
based on SBAS (GLASS). The approach remains a 
3D approach of type B, also known as a non-precision 
approach with vertical guidance. For continuity assur-
ance in terms of hardware failure, it is advisable that the 
processing hardware, SBAS receiver and VDB transmitter 
are doubled. That way, in case of a single-point failure, 
the continuous operation of the GLASS is assured. The 
hardware reliability of the VDB transmitter was already 
looked at for GLS and could easily be transferred to the 
GLASS. The approach procedures could be published 
as GLS approaches with a higher minimum, and a note 
could be added to the chart that the service is APV only. 
Alternatively, a GLS channel could be added to the RNP 
approach procedure chart. Either way, the required pilot 
training would be minimal. Apart from the extended time 
to alert, the system mimics a pure SBAS receiver, and it 
is our belief that not a whole lot of additional certification 
is required. Thus, the overall cost of the GLASS can be 
held low to make it attractive for purchase by airports. 
Moreover, a portable version of GLASS could be installed 
airborne using a low-power VHF transmitter. This trans-
mitter would feed directly in the VDB input of the GLS 
receiver. Additionally, when used in this manner, the 
issue of different ionosphere pierce points does not occur. 
The GLASS provides the LPV final approach segment to 
GLS-only-equipped aircraft such as the 737–800. This can 
enable increased access to airports that are currently not 
equipped with an xLS-type approach such as Innsbruck 
(LOWI). In particular, approaches in France could be of 
interest, since the government has officially declared to 
decommission all category 1 ILS installations in favor of 
RNP approaches with LPV.
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